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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 






On appeal, Defendant/Appellant Adrian Gordon is challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence presented to the trial court in connection with a charge for murder. (See Brief of 
Appellant, dated December 13,2002.) Gordon's case was tried to the bench. This Court has 
ruled that in reviewing a verdict from the bench, it will consider the trial court's findings of 
fact supporting the verdict, and it will apply the "clearly erroneous" standard to those 
findings. State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191,192-93 (Utah 1987). This Court has specified that 
if findings are not supported by the clear weight of the evidence, or if this Court reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings will be set aside. Id. 
Where findings are insupportable, the conviction must be reversed. 
In accordance with Walker, and pursuant to the traditional standards for challenging 
findings on appeal, Gordon has marshaled the evidence relating to the findings and he has 
demonstrated that many of the findings made by the trial court are either insupportable or 
irrelevant. (See Brief of Appellant.) In part, the state does not dispute that findings are 
erroneous or irrelevant. (See State's Brief of Appellee ("State's Brief) at 16-18.) 
Notwithstanding the indefensible findings, the state asserts that the verdict in this case should 
be affirmed. For the reasons set forth below, and as set forth in the Brief of Appellant, 
Gordon respectfully urges this Court to reject the state's analysis and to reverse the conviction 
for murder. 
ARGUMENT 
WHERE THE CRITICAL FACTUAL ISSUE IN THIS CASE CONCERNS 
THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ATTACKER, THE STATES OWN 
EVIDENCE REFUTES THAT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT GORDON 
COMMITTED THE MURDER 
As set forth in Gordon's opening brief, at the conclusion of a bench trial Gordon was 
convicted of murder. (Brief of Appellant.) The primary factual issue at trial in the case 
concerned the identification of the assailant. (See. State's Brief at 16.) 
In determining that Gordon was the attacker, the trial court specified that none of the 
"pieces of evidence" alone compelled a conviction against Gordon. (R. 211:537.) Rather, 
according to the judge, the facts in combination provided a "texture of threads" to form the 
conclusion and to paint a vivid picture. (R. 211:537.) In connection with rendering its 
verdict in the case, the trial court articulated more than 30 findings (as identified in the Brief 
Appellant at 24-28). 
Gordon has challenged many of the findings on appeal under the "clearly erroneous" 
standard. Indeed, he has separated the findings into four categories, where the initial 
category of findings is uncontested, and the remaining findings are challenged in three 
respects: the first set of challenged findings consists of the insupportable findings. They 
must be rejected. (Brief of Appellant at 30-34.) With one exception, the state does not take 
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issue with Gordon's assessment of the first set of findings. (See State's Brief at 16-17; infra. 
point B., below.) 
The second set of challenged findings consists of irrelevant findings and/or improper 
inferences. (Brief of Appellant at 34-39.) The state does not dispute Gordon's assessment 
that those findings are irrelevant. (State Brief at 17-18.) 
The third set of challenged findings relates to eyewitness identification testimony. 
Gordon maintains that the evidence supports that the witness Gustavo Diaz-Hernandez was 
mistaken in his eyewitness identification testimony. (Brief of Appellant at 39-46.) The state 
disputes Gordon's analysis and argues that Hernandez's identification testimony was reliable. 
(See State's Brief at 18-20.) The state disregards the overwhelming, objective facts in 
conflict with Hernandez's testimony. 
Where the state in this case was unable to present a thread of direct evidence tying 
Gordon to the offense, the evidence was circumstantial. While circumstantial evidence may 
be sufficient to support a conviction, Gordon maintains that the circumstances of this case 
support otherwise, as further set forth below. 
A. THE STATE SEEMS TO DISMISS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AS 
IRRELEVANT "COMMENTS" AND "MUSINGS." SINCE THE STATE 
CONSIDERS THE FINDINGS TO BE IMMATERIAL HERE, THIS COURTMAY 
REVIEW THE MATTER WITHOUT DEFERENCE TO THOSE FINDINGS. 
The state seems to claim that a trial court judgment may be sustained if it is supported 
by the record. (See State's Brief at 8.) The state asserts that review of a sufficiency claim 
"is review of the evidence to determine whether it supports the conviction, not whether it 
supports all of the fact-finder's comments, musings, and analysis." (State's Brief at 14.) 
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The state's assertions may be appropriate in the context of reviewing a sufficiency 
claim after ajury trial. In that instance, the comments and musings of a multi-member panel 
are not relevant on appeal. See Walker. 743 P.2d at 192-93. However, this case was not 
tried to ajury. Thus, the standard of review applicable to a sufficiency claim after ajury trial 
is not applicable here. IdL 
In this case, the finder of fact was a single judge. This Court has ruled that it will 
apply a different standard of review to a sufficiency claim after a bench trial. See idL For 
a bench trial, this Court will apply the "clearly erroneous" standard to the trial court's 
"findings of fact" as set forth in Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. I&_ 
Rule 52(a) provides that "[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without ajury or with 
an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions 
of law thereon." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (2003). According to the rule, a trial court sitting as 
fact finder must make specific supportable findings, sufficient to sustain the ultimate 
determination. Also, the findings must be sufficient for a reviewing court to assess the basis 
for the ultimate verdict. 
Stated another way, "[t]o provide meaningful appellate review, the trial court's 
findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to clearly show 
the evidence upon which they are grounded." State in the Interest of ST.. 928 P.2d 393,398 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (Wilkins, J.); id. at 399 (recognizing that findings of fact must report 
the facts found to be true and support the ultimate judgment). 
Findings of fact "serve multiple purposes. Appellate review is only one of those 
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purposes; informing the parties of the reasoning employed by the trial court [in reaching its 
decision] is another." Id at 399; also Tavlor v. Estate of Tavlor. 770 P.2d 163,168 (Utah 
Ct App. 1989) ("Findings of fact serve two important purposes: (1) informing the parties 
of the trial court's analysis, and (2) providing a basis for review by the appellate court"). 
"The trial court's findings and conclusions must reveal the court's reasoning clearly enough 
that an appellate court can apply the appropriate standard of review to each part of the trial 
court's ruling." Griffith v. Griffiths 1999 UT 78,1fl0,985 P.2d 255. 
Without sufficient findings in a bench trial, the transcript on appeal simply reflects 
unresolved contested factual issues. Consider the case of Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 
(Utah 1979). There, a homeowner sued a builder for construction deficiencies. Id. at 1337. 
The homeowner claimed that an agreement between the parties held the builder responsible 
for the manner in which work was done on several aspects of a construction project. The 
construction was done in an unworkmanlike manner. The homeowner filed suit and 
requested damages against the builder in the amount of $20,000. The builder 
counterclaimed for $500, which constituted the balance of the price due under the contract. 
Id. at 1337-38. The case was tried to the bench. Id, 
At the conclusion of trial, the judge entered findings of fact on the matter, and 
determined that the builder was responsible only for one aspect of the construction project. 
The trial judge entered judgment in favor of the homeowner in the amount of $2,000, and 
the homeowner appealed. IdL at 1337-38. This Court reviewed the matter and found that 
the trial court's findings were incomplete. Specifically, there was no indication as to why 
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the trial court found the builder to be responsible only with respect to one aspect of the 
project when other aspects were listed on the "bid." The findings also were inconsistent on 
their face. Id. at 1338-39. On that basis, this Court remanded the case for proper findings 
"in accordance with the evidence." Id. 
Rucker supports that in a bench trial, the court must make findings to support the 
ultimate determination. "The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of 
fact in a case tried by a judge is essential to the resolution of dispute under the proper rule 
of law." Id. at 1338. The "findings should be sufficiently distinct and certain as not to 
require an investigation or review to determine what issues are decided." Id. (cite omitted). 
Next, pursuant to Utah law, if an appellate court determines that a finding is clearly 
erroneous / insupportable, it is rejected. Insupportable findings serve to erode the factual 
basis for the trial court's ultimate determination. See State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 687 
(Utah 1990) ("A finding not supported by substantial, competent evidence must be 
rejected"); Walker. 743 P.2d at 193 (recognizing that an appellate court must reject a trial 
court's findings if the court considers them to be clearly erroneous) (citing Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971)).1 
!In support of its claim that the trial judge here was required to render only an ultimate 
verdict, the state has cited to Rule 44 of the juvenile rules. (See State's Brief at 15.) That 
rule states that in certain instances, "findings of fact shall not be necessary." Utah R. Juv. 
P. 44(a) (2003). The state does not explain how that rule is relevant here since this case was 
not presented in juvenile court. In addition, Rule 52(a), which is applicable here, requires 
that in connection with a bench trial, the court "shall find the facts specially." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a). If anything, the state's reference to the juvenile rule emphasizes the importance of 
findings under Rule 52(a). That is, the procedural rules clearly articulate when findings are 
6 
Consider the following example. Suppose the trial court here entered a finding that 
Gordon's white Reebok shoes were used in the homicide at issue. (See R. 209:290-92 
(bloody footprints from a Reebok shoe were found at the scene of the crime); 210:500 
(officers located white Reebok shoes belonging to Gordon).) That finding would be rejected 
as insupportable. (R. 210:500 (Gordon's Reebok shoes did not match the prints found at the 
scene).) If such a finding had been made to support the trial court's determination that 
Gordon was the assailant, the lack of support for the finding would serve to erode this Court's 
confidence in the verdict. Indeed, this Court would be left with a definite and firm con-
viction that a mistake had been committed in the matter. See Walker. 743 P.2d at 192-93. 
Here, the trial judge made findings of fact specially and separately from the ultimate 
determination. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). The judge recognized the importance of the 
findings in the context of this case in rendering the ultimate verdict. The judge stated the 
following: 
specifically mandated (Rule 52(a)), and when they are not (Rule 44(a)). 
The state also relies on State v. NageL 2001 UT App 268, an unpublished decision 
from the court of appeals. (State's Brief at 16.) In that case, the court of appeals addressed 
an argument raised by defendant concerning witness credibility. It is unclear from the 
unpublished decision how the issue was raised. Assuming arguendo, the issue was raised in 
the context of a sufficiency issue after a bench trial, there is no indication that the court of 
appeals was aware of the standard of review applicable in such cases. Specifically, the court 
did not identify the "clearly erroneous" standard set forth in Walker. 743 P.2d at 192-93, 
State v. Featherson. 781 P.2d 424,432 (Utah 1989) (identifying clearly erroneous standard 
applicable in a bench trial under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)), or Rule 52(a). Thus, the 
unpublished opinion in NageL does not appear to be applicable or helpful to the issue on 
appeal here. See Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter. 785 P.2d 1087,1090 (Utah 1989) (where 
the case law relied upon by a party failed to include analysis, it was not dispositive of the 
issue); see State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68,1J6 n.2,31 P.3d 528 (state relied on case law that was 
not dispositive). 
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[A]s with all cases, criminal and civil but particularly criminal, it's not one thing that 
makes the difference in a person's determination of guilt or innocence. It's a texture 
of threads that come together that form a conclusion. 
As Mr. Gotay pointed out, being at the 7-Eleven is not a crime. None of the 
acts or the pieces of evidence if they stood alone would probably be sufficient. It's 
the totality that, when they come together, paint a vivid picture. And to that end, I 
would point out that that is where the basis for this conviction lies. 
(R. 211:537.) The trial court seemed to recognize that without the "texture of threads," the 
ultimate verdict could not be sustained. 
On appeal, the state disregards the important role served by specific and separate 
findings of fact in a bench trial. Even where Utah case law has emphasized the importance 
of such findings, and even where the trial court emphasized the importance of such findings 
in this case, the state seems to argue that findings in general are irrelevant to the issue here. 
(See State's Brief at 16, 17.) In that regard, the state does not dispute that certain findings 
entered by the court in this matter are insupportable, unreasonable, immaterial and irrelevant. 
(See State's Brief at 16-21.) Where findings are insupportable, the ultimate verdict is in 
doubt. 
Inadequate findings make application of the proper rule of law "difficult, if not 
impossible." Rucker, 598 P.2d at 1339. Without proper findings, the fabric of evidence 
against Gordon fails to cover the gap between the presumption of innocence and the proof 
of guilt 
Under the law, and in compliance with the "clearly erroneous" standard identified in 
Walker, Gordon has demonstrated that many of the threads purportedly supporting the 
conviction do not tie Gordon to the crime. (See Brief of Appellant at 30-46.) Without 
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supportable findings, the foundation for the ultimate verdict is eroded to the point that it must 
be rejected. On that basis, Gordon respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction 
in this matter. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT AND THE STATE HAVE IDENTIFIED THE LINCHPIN 
OF THE CASE AS HERNANDEZ'S EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
TESTIMONY. OVERWHELMING. OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE UNDERMINES 
THAT TESTIMONY. 
The state asserts in its brief that the trial court's finding relating to the lighting on the 
morning of the homicide is relevant to Hernandez's testimony that he observed the assailant 
commit the murder. (State's Brief at 16.) In addition, the state asserts without discussion or 
analysis that the evidence here supports the finding "that the lighting, while imperfect, was 
sufficient to allow Diaz-Hernandez to identify defendant." (State's Brief at 16.) The state 
then provides a string of record citations. (IdL at 17.) The state does not discuss in its brief 
how those citations to the record support the trial court's finding that the lighting was 
sufficient. (Id at 17.) 
The state's bare citations are inadequate. The appellate rules require more than a bald 
citation to the record or to authority; the rules require reasoned analysis and a discussion of 
the facts in the case. See State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299,304-05 (Utah 1998); Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(9) and (b) (2003) (identifying standard for adequate briefing); State v. Montova. 
937 P.2d 145,150 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (declining to address the state's arguments where 
the state failed to meet the briefing requirements set forth in Rule 24(a)(9)). Where the 
state's brief contains only citations to the record in support of its argument that the trial 
court's finding is sustainable, this Court should reject the state's argument. 
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In addition, those portions of the record cited in the state's brief do not support that 
the lighting was adequate to allow Hernandez to identify the assailant. Specifically, the state 
cites to volume 208 of the record, pages 42-43,101,114,117, and 119-120. (State's Brief, 
17.) Also, the state cites to volume 211, which does not contain evidence. (Id; see R. 211.) 
The record citations identified by the state reflect the following: The state's witness 
Cathy Burget testified that the area in front of the 7-Eleven store was pretty well lit (R. 
208:42-43). She also testified that the dumpster area where the attack occurred was "not 
light"; it was "pretty good" if "you're closer" to the dumpster, 3 or 4 feet away. (R. 208:42-
44; see also 209:303, 374; 210:396-97 (Hernandez was 75, 142 and 282 feet away when 
he made observations).) The state's citation to the record does not support the trial court's 
finding that the lighting was sufficient to allow Hernandez to identify the assailant. 
The state's next record citation supports that Hernandez was "estimating that he could 
see" the dumpster area early that morning, and he referred to a dark photo of the store. (R. 
208:114 (identifying State's Exhibit 26).) To be clear, Hernandez testified that the area north 
of the store near the dumpster was "[n]ot very well lighted." (R. 208:61-62.) He testified 
that the store "now" has lights on the north side of the building, "[b]ut I don't think it had 
any on" September 29,2001. (R. 208:62.) 
As for the state's remaining record citations, they do not relate to lighting. (See R. 
208:707 (Hernandez testified he was 100% sure that Gordon was the assailant); 208:117-18 
(Hernandez testified that he saw the assailant's face in the dark for 3-4 seconds); 208:119-120 
(as Hernandez was walking in the area he realized a crime was being committed).) Indeed 
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the overwhelming evidence from the state's witnesses support the determination that it was 
very dark that morning. (See R. 209:283-84, and State's Exhibit 23 (Steve Butcher testified 
that the distance from the sidewalk to the comer of the store was such that a person could 
not see behind the dumpster even "if it was daylight"; and he testified that even up close, it 
was so dark that morning, he could not see Lundskog's face); R. 209:369-72 (Officer Judd 
took photographs for the state in November at night); 210:398 (Judd had no information 
regarding the lighting at the store on September 29).) 
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant, the trial court's finding that the lighting was 
sufficient to allow Hernandez to identify the assailant cannot be sustained. (See Brief of 
Appellant at 31-32.) The overwhelming evidence supports insufficient lighting to make an 
accurate identification. The weakness in that finding compromises the texture of threads 
sustaining the verdict against Gordon. The objective, overwhelming evidence should raise 
doubt about the validity of the verdict here. 
Next, the state admits that many of the findings made in connection with the trial 
court's ruling were irrelevant or insubstantial. (See State's Brief at 16-17 (stating that the 
only relevant finding in defendant's "first set" of challenged findings related to "lighting"; 
"[o]ther challenged 'findings' were not relevant").) The state does not dispute that the trial 
court's following findings were in error: 
The trial court found that robbery was the motive for the homicide (see Brief of 
Appellant at 30-31). 
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The trial court found that there were no cars at the 7-Eleven at 5:30 (see id. at 32-33).2 
And the court found that Gordon and Lundskog interacted, they left together and after 
they left, no one saw the victim alive again (id. at 33-34). 
Those findings are improper. (Brief of Appellant at 30-34.) 
The state does not dispute that additional findings are irrelevant (see State's Brief at 
17-18). The additional, irrelevant findings include the following: 
Clothing that Gordon wore on the morning in question was distinctly and 
conspicuously clean (Brief of Appellant at 34-35). 
Gordon was mistaken in that he went in and out of the 7-Eleven three times rather 
than one (id at 35). 
White tennis shoes were not found in a home where Gordon had been staying, and 
2
 The state claims that the trial court simply failed to note that "Augustin Castaneda, 
another witness, pulled into the 7-Eleven at 5:30." (State's Brief at 17.) The state considers 
that failure to be "inconsequential." (Id.) Yet, the trial court made its finding based on 
Hernandez's testimony. Specifically, Hernandez testified at trial that he observed the attack. 
He described events in detail, including the fact that after the attacker stomped on Lundskog, 
he then entered the store and came out again with large bags in each hand. The attacker then 
placed the bags in the back seat of a Nissan/Chevrolet that pulled into the store parking lot. 
The attacker walked over to Lundskog and kicked him again before he left the store property. 
Hernandez specifically observed only the attacker and the Nissan/Chevrolet at the store. He 
did not observe any other activity at the store that morning. (R. 208:78-85.) 
Based on Hernandez's testimony, and the videotape of Gordon's activities inside the 
store, the state argued that Gordon committed the homicide between 5:27 and 5:31 that 
morning. (See R. 210:508.) Thus, in an effort to give Hernandez's testimony and the state's 
theory credibility, the trial court found that there were no cars at the store at 5:30. (R. 
211:544.) The overwhelming and objective evidence supports the determination that a 
mistake was committed with respect to that finding. Between 5:27 and 5:31, when Gordon 
supposedly was committing a homicide just outside the 7-Eleven store, three cars pulled into 
the parking lot, and four people entered the store. (R. 209:228-31; 210:437-38; 210:469-70; 
210:482-84.) There is no indication that any of those individuals saw or heard anything 
unusual at the store. Yet, if Gordon was the attacker as claimed by the state, those four 
individuals would have been closer to the incident than Hernandez. The trial court's finding 
that there were no cars at the store was meant to bolster credibility. It was erroneous. 
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white tennis shoes would have shown signs of the homicide (id at 35-36). 
The court considered it to be a distinctive fact that Gordon did not keep a pair of 
white tennis shoes at the home where he had been staying prior to and on September 
29,2001 (id at 37). 
Although Robert Mellen did not observe criminal activity that morning, he was 
uneasy and nervous. He was suspicious of Gordon and testified that Gordon looked 
at him pretty hard (id. at 36-37). 
While the trial court stated it would not take into account the fact that Gordon did not 
testify in this case, the court observed that Gordon's demeanor at trial lacked emotion, 
thereby contributing to the verdict (id at 37-38). 
Here, the state does not dispute that many of the findings made by the trial court were 
improper. (See State's Brief at 16-18.) Those findings must be set aside. Where many of 
the trial court's findings are irrelevant and not sustainable, this Court should be "left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Walker, 743 P.2d at 192-93 
(citing Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971)). Stated another 
way, since the trial court here made numerous improper findings, that is a basis for reversing 
the conviction in this case. Indeed, many of the threads purportedly holding the fabric of 
evidence together are erroneous. 
Without the erroneous findings set forth above, the evidence reflected the following: 
It was dark on the morning of the homicide (R. 208:127 (Hernandez testified it was too dark, 
"nothing could be seen"); 209:268 (Steven Butcher testified that it was dark at 5:45).) 
Gordon was at the 7-Eleven store between 5:20 and 5:32. (R. 210:426-28,439-41.) Gordon 
entered the store three times. He was mistaken when he reported that he believed he entered 
the 7-Eleven store just once. (R. 210:452; State's Exhibit 57 at 22.) Gordon was not in 
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view of the 7-Eleven video camera between 5:27 and 5:31. Mellen did not see Gordon and 
Lundskog interact that morning. (R. 209:258.) 
Gordon had no reason to attack Lundskog. A state expert did not detect blood on 
Gordon's clothes (R. 209:354-55, 358). Gordon kept a pair of white Reebok shoes at a 
friend's house. Gordon's shoes did not match the bloody prints at the store. (R. 210:500.) 
During the time that Gordon allegedly was involved in an attack, three cars pulled into 
the 7-Eleven parking lot and four people walked into the store. (R. 210:437-38, 482-83.) 
Those individuals did not report anything unusual that morning at the 7-Eleven. (See R. 
210:482-83; 209:233-34.) 
In the end, as set forth in the opening Brief, the state's entire case hinged on the 
eyewitness identification testimony of a single witness: Hernandez. Hernandez testified that 
he heard and saw the attack in the dark. He made his alleged observations from 75,142, and 
282 feet away. (R. 208:64-67, 73-74, 77-78; 210:396-97; 209:303,374.) He testified that 
he observed only the attacker and the Nissan/Chevrolet car at the 7-Eleven that morning. (R. 
208:78, 80-85.) He did not indicate any other activity at the 7-Eleven. 
The state argues that Hernandez's testimony implicating Gordon in the crime was 
reliable and sufficient to support a guilty verdict. (See State's Brief, 20.) The state relies on 
Hernandez's "very good eyesight," his report of the attack to his coworker (R. 209:204 
(Hernandez reported to a coworker that he witnessed an attack behind the dumpster)), and 
Hernandez's objectivity in the matter, where Hernandez did not make his observations while 
being attacked or threatened. (Id.) The state's argument places undue confidence in the 
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observations of one person. As set forth in the opening brief, many discrepancies in the 
evidence place Hernandez's eyewitness identification in doubt. (Brief of Appellant, 39-46.) 
Specifically, Hernandez testified that he heard/observed the events over a period of 
9 to 10 minutes, while Gordon was out of view of the camera for under four minutes. (R. 
208:76-77; 210:436,439.) Also, Hernandez was the only person to observe the assailant; no 
other person was in the area during the matter. Yet, according to the videotape, while 
Gordon was out of camera view, several patrons were in and out of the store. (R. 209:229-
31; 210:437-38,469,482-84.) That evidence supports Gordon was not the attacker. 
While some of Hernanez's testimony was similar to events reflected in the videotape, 
that does not support that Gordon committed the homicide beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Specifically, Hernandez told a friend, Jose Lopez, about the incident. (R. 208:136.) Lopez 
reported the crime to police as though he had witnessed it, even though he had not. (R. 208: 
93-97; 208:138.) In connection with reporting the crime, Lopez viewed the videotape at the 
police station, and he identified Gordon as the assailant. (R. 208:168,179.) Lopezthenwent 
home and described Gordon and the videotaped events to Hernandez. (R. 208:138.) 
Hernandez likely learned from Lopez's description of videotaped events that Gordon 
entered the 7-Eleven more than once. Thereafter, Hernandez testified that the attacker 
entered the 7-Eleven after he kicked Lundskog. (R. 208:78-80.) 
In this case, other objective facts fail to support that the attacker entered the store at 
all. That is, according to investigating officers, the attacker left bloody foot prints at the 
scene. There is no indication that the bloody prints went into or toward the 7-Eleven store. 
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(See R. 209:290,336,351,363-64.) In addition, employees for the 7-Eleven did not observe 
or clean bloody prints from the floor. (R. 208:51; see also R. 209:331.) Thus, in the end, 
Hernandez's testimony implicating Gordon appeared to based on information Lopez observed 
from the videotape. (See Brief of Appellant at 45.) 
Also, Hernandez likely learned from Lopez's description of videotaped events that 
Gordon carried something out of the store. (See R. 210:430-31.) Thereafter, Hernandez 
testified that after the attack, the assailant went into the store and he came out carrying bags 
that were 2Vi feet tall and 1 Vi feet wide. (R. 208:83-84.) On this specific point, Hernandez's 
testimony implicating Gordon is discredited by events captured on video. According to the 
video, Gordon carried items out of the store before Lundskog was attacked. (See R. 210:430-
31,466.) Thus, Hernandez's testimony is in error. 
In sum, Hernandez's observations were made in the dark from 75,142, and 282 feet 
away (R. 210:396-97; 209:303,374). According to state witnesses, lighting in the area was 
inadequate, particularly at those distances (Brief of Appellant at 31-32, 41); the timing of 
Hernandez's observations did not coincide with the time that Gordon was at the 7-Eleven 
store; and Hernandez's testimony implicating Gordon was in conflict with information 
captured on videotape, and information learned from the bloody footprints. (See Brief of 
Appellant at 39-46.) 
This Court has recognized that eyewitness identification testimony is fallible. An 
eyewitness is not not like a camera. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986). Here, 
Hernandez claimed to observe a violent beating in the dark from several feet away. It 
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frightened him. When the attacker turned only once (R. 208:117), Hernandez saw his face 
for 3 or 4 seconds (R. 208:118); he then avoided the attacker by looking away (R. 208:74-
75). Initially Hernandez could not say whether the suspect had facial hair or jewelry, and 
initially he did not identify Gordon as the attacker. (R. 208:127; 208:107-09.) He testified 
it was so dark, "nothing could be seen" (R. 208:127), he was "traumatized" (R. 208:129), 
and "[w]hen it comes to sad cases," he did not like to "remember them that well." (R. 
208:146.) While Hernadez was sincere in his identification testimony, he was fallible. 
When this Court examines all the evidence in this case, it should be left with 
reasonable doubt in the verdict. Many trial court findings are irrelevant and insupportable, 
and Hernandez's fallible, but sincere, eyewitness testimony is in conflict with objective facts. 
The findings supporting the guilty verdict in this case should be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, and as set forth in the Brief of Appellant, Gordon 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment and vacate the guilty verdict on 
the basis that the evidence is insufficient to support the determination that Gordon 
committed the homicide in this case. 
SUBMITTED this £^day of r > ^ 2003. 
pkjfcTk 
LINDA M.JONES( 
MICHAEL A. PETERSON 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEF. ASSOC. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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